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Aesthetics of Movement and Everyday Aesthetics
  Pentti Määttänen 
Abstract
How the general notion of experience is understood determines
to some extent what one thinks about art and aesthetic
experience. Pragmatism widens the concept of experience from
that of sense experience. Action, practice and movement are
epistemologically significant elements of experience. The
environment is not just perceived, it is experienced also by
acting, moving around and participating in different practices,
as can be spelled out in terms of Peircean semiotics. From the
pragmatist point of view, aesthetic experience is not
characterized only as disinterested contemplation of art works
and other elements of our environment as objects of
perception. Aesthetic experience is intertwined with different
social and cultural practices in the flux of our everyday life.[1]
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1. Semiotics of Space
According to Charles Peirce, the main idea of pragmatism is to
widen the concept of experience beyond that of sense
experience.[2] The epistemological role of action must be
taken into account. We are embodied beings, living organisms
that are in continuous interaction with our environment. The
Cartesian dichotomy between internal and external does not
make sense in the pragmatist account. We are in this one
world already, and the important distinctions are those
between different kinds of activities in this world, as opposed
to the distinction between what is inside (in the head or in the
mind) and what is "out there" in the external world.
The semiotic theory of Peirce is an essential element of his
pragmatism. According to this theory, signs are three-place
relations between objects, sign-vehicles and interpretants. A
sign-vehicle refers to its object, but not by itself. It must be
interpreted to refer to its object, and the interpretant serves
that purpose. There are different kinds of interpretants, but
the most important one is the final logical interpretant, a habit
of action that terminates the chain of interpretation.[3] There
are different levels of meaningful activities, linguistic, artistic
and so on, but our bodily action in the physical environment is
also meaningful action.
What a thing means, Peirce says, is simply what habits it
involves.[4] Chairs and tables, doors and windows, buildings,
squares and the like, all literally objects of perception, are
interpreted through habitual activities (actual or potential) that
are related to them. As moving pieces of flesh, we interpret
the environment in the course of everyday life through our
habits. As cultural beings, we also attach symbolic meanings
to objects of perception; therefore we have a multilayered
system of meanings corresponding to different kinds of
interaction with our physical and cultural environment.[5]
We also experience the social environment it, as moving parts
of it, by moving around, walking and jogging and using cars,
buses and trams. Fellow citizens are experienced in terms of
what they are about to do, how they are about to act. This
mutual anticipation of one's own and other people's actions is
a way of thinking about and interpreting social reality. Strictly
speaking, one cannot perceive social reality. We can perceive
a police officer, but the institution of law and order cannot be
reduced to him. From the symbols that an officer carries, we
can conclude that s/he will probably behave in a certain way in
certain circumstances. But such activity is perceived only after
it begins. Social reality thus exists as habits of social action
and is also experienced through action by participating in
habitual social practices.[6]
Meanings, on the other hand, exist as habitual social practices,
i.e., habits are meanings. This is one way to express the
principle of meaning as use, and not only by way of linguistic
expression, but by use of any object like tools, instruments,
buildings and so on. The wider notion of experience leads to a
wider notion of meaning as well.[7] This notion of meaning
entails that when we experience our environment as
meaningful, when we attach meanings to it, we experience it
as places and objects related to different kinds of meaningful
social practices. A church, for example, is associated with
certain religious texts as well as with different ceremonies and
rituals performed by people coming to the place and behaving
in appropriate ways. An art gallery or a concert hall is
interpreted to be not only a specific place for exhibiting and
performing works of art but also a place associated with
various cultural practices, conventions and conceptions,
including views about aesthetics.[8] Museums and galleries are
the places where paintings and other objects can be
experienced in an impersonal environment not too closely
connected to the pleasures and sorrows of practical, everyday
life. Similarly, musical scholarship suggests that the idea of
concert halls as places where musical 'works' could be
completed apart from everyday matters developed along the
same lines and for the same reasons as museums and
galleries.[9] In this way the environment can be seen as a
system of signs, a sort of spatial code, interpreted with
linguistic and other meaningful practices.[10]
In moving around we move in the middle of this system of
signs that are interpreted in terms of these meanings to the
extent we are acquainted with the practices in question, as
well as when we are not actually participating in these
practices. All places and locations are saturated with these
meanings which, in one way or another, affect our everyday
experience.
2. Art as Experience
There are different sorts of pragmatism, but if we take
seriously one of the incentives of classical pragmatism, namely
the theory of evolution, the conclusion is that as products of
nature we do not have access to any transcendental spheres.
Thus, the Neo-Kantian conception of aesthetic experience as
disinterested appeal to the transcendent cannot be accepted.
Instead, all experience is interpreted in terms of meanings,
and all meanings are tied to different kinds of actions.
Therefore we cannot have experiences completely devoid of
practical engagement. We can, however, distinguish between
two kinds of action.
Aristotle defined praxis as action the goal of which is the
action itself and poiesis as action the goal of which is the
product of that action.[11] For example, building a boat is
poiesis. The best example of praxis, on the other hand, is life.
To live a good and happy life is the highest purpose of life
itself. Life as praxis has no specific product or outcome that
could be of higher value, and we are not in the world for the
purpose of being transported to transcendence. Ethics is
concerned about what kinds of choices are proper for living a
good and happy life. For Aristotle these problems are always
contextual; the choices are about particular acts in concrete
circumstances.
In a similar way, one can distinguish between two kinds of
experiences: experiences that are valuable in themselves and
experiences that are primarily means for some further
experiences. This is precisely the distinction that John Dewey
used as a basis in his definition of aesthetic experience.[12]
This notion is completely at odds with the Kantian notion of
aesthetic experience.[13] Of course, Dewey had much more to
say about aesthetic experiences, but this basic distinction
enables us to define disinterestedness in a relative way.
Aesthetic experience is disinterested in the sense that it is
relatively independent of activities that one has to perform in
order achieve some further goals. For example, usually one
has to buy a ticket for a concert, but few people go to
concerts in order to have ticket-buying experiences. Usually
they seek musical experience. Dewey's distinction is also
formal in the sense that it does not specify the content of an
aesthetic experience. Something can be experienced as
beautiful, sublime, horrifying, exiting or whatever as long as it
is something that is pursued for its own sake.
Consequentially and importantly, then, aesthetic experiences
in general are not separated from practical activities. On the
contrary, they are forms of praxis, important elements of a
good and happy life, and they can be neatly intertwined with
other practical activities that can be considered forms of
praxis. In general we are not dealing with categorical but with
relative distinctions. An aesthetic experience may have a
further goal, such as self-education, and it is possible to be so
enthusiastic about one's work that it becomes almost a goal in
itself. Aesthetics in this sense is intertwined with life; it is a
kind of everyday aesthetics rather than a doctrine about
transcendentmatters.
A good example of this kind of everyday aesthetics is the so-
called praxial philosophy of music and music education. It is
based on the Aristotelian notion of praxis but not limited to it,
as becomes clear from Thomas Regelski's extensive
analysis.[14] However, praxialists usually refuse to use the
word 'aesthetic' because the term is quite often understood in
the spirit of Neo-Kantian aesthetics that is strongly criticized
by them. Another reason is the fact that it is often hard to tell
what exactly is meant by the word, the Kantian, Deweyan, or
some other meaning. Regardless of this terminological issue,
the point is that works of art are discussed in the context of
other social and cultural activities without the theoretical
burden of the aesthetic views developed in connection with
gallery art. Music as "good time," - literally, as "worth while"
time, time well-spent, to use Regelski's expression, is a good
example of a Deweyan sort of aesthetic experience.
3. Aesthetics of Movement
Dewey's definition of aesthetic experience is based on the
distinction between means and ends. In a similar way, moving
may be determined by a need to proceed to a certain place --
home, work or somewhere else -- in an efficient way. Then it
is purely a means for getting to that place. On the other hand,
people may be moving around without any definite ideas about
where to go. In this case movement is a kind of end in itself.
These kinds of differences in the motives of moving have an
effect on ways of moving, for example on whether one goes on
foot or uses vehicles. As in Dewey's aesthetics, the distinction
between movement as means and as an end is relative. Both
aspects may be present.
Now the question arises whether those experiences of moving
and experiences related to movement that are pursued for
their own sake can be called aesthetic experiences in Dewey's
sense. At least it can be said that they satisfy Dewey's formal
definition of aesthetic experience. If the consummatory
aspect[15] of the overall experience of movement is
dominant, it is quite safe to conclude that movement can be
an element in our everyday aesthetics. This kind of movement
may even be a part of the pragmatist slogan "make your life a
work of art." Actually the pragmatist framework is not even
necessary for this, as is shown by the modernist example of
the flaneur.
There is no movement without context, without physical and
social environment. Various elements of the environment may
give rise to experiences that contain elements of
consummation. An old metaphor compares the urban
environment with a machine. But machines are not designed
for the purpose of serving the needs of their own constituent
parts, the nuts and bolts, wheels, bearings and gears of the
machine itself. Machines, instead, are designed for the purpose
of maximum output with sufficiently good quality. What, in
comparison, is the output of the city-machine? Is it profit for
some people, or is it a good life for the moving parts of the
urban machine, that is for the people living in that
environment?
4. The Ethical Dimension
Aesthetics is intertwined with ethics. Aesthetic praxis is not so
different from other forms of praxis. Aesthetic goals and other
goals of good life cannot be categorically separated, and there
are no easy solutions to what specific choices are good.
Aristotle defined the good by saying that good is that for which
people strive. The problem is that people seem to strive for
different goals. No one of these goals can be taken as a
common denominator of all possible good things, as the moral
good by virtue of which other good things are good. This is
relatred to the accusations of the so-called naturalistic fallacy.
These accusations are, however, based on a kind of aprioristic
fallacy, the assumption that some common denominator exists
and that it can be found out with a priori conceptual
reasoning. However, nothing guarantees that such a common
denominator actually exists.
Aristotle observed that ethical choices depend heavily on
context. The pragmatist notion of meaning, according to which
meanings are habitual practices, entails that it is not possible
to find sufficient and necessary conditions that govern all kinds
of phenomena. The true character of praxis is that it leaves
room for different kinds of goals that can be considered to be
good goals from certain points of view. The relevant problem
of philosophical ethics is not the problem of a one-and-only
definition of moral good as opposed to all natural goods, but of
finding a way to contribute to the creation of circumstances in
which people can discuss and negotiate how to accommodate
their respective goals in a fair and equal way.
These considerations all have some consequences for the
urban machine in which some of us live. If the machine is
designed with "poietic" principles, just to function smoothly
and efficiently to produce an output distinct and separate from
the machine itself, it probably is not the best machine for
praxis, for the happy life of the moving parts of that machine.
These parts have slightly different values and goals, different
ways of life and points of view, not to mention different tastes
in art. The friction caused by these differences should be
diminished, not by forcing all moving parts to move and
function in terms of efficiency, but by using enough lubricant
to allow for realizing individual (but not individualistic)
purposes. Art in an everyday context can play some role in this
lubrication.
The stress on art in everyday context does not, of course,
mean that galleries, museums and concert halls should be
closed. Neither does it mean that art works as physical objects
should necessarily be different. The same physical entity can
be interpreted in different ways. To take something as a work
of art is to interpret it with meanings, and these meanings are
linguistic, educational and so on. The variety of these practices
and traditions implies that there will always be as different as
theaesthetic views and attitudes with which people evaluate
art works and other objects of the environment. The
pragmatist point of view easily allows for this pluralism as it
denies the possibility of a priori ethical standards and analyses
of cultural phenomena in the relevant practical context.
The environment around us is quite complicated. The physical
environment of buildings, squares, roads and vehicles can
perhaps be made to function as a machine, but that
environment is loaded with cultural meanings and is
intertwined with our social environment. The social reality
exists as habitual social practices and is interpreted and
experienced in the same way as physical reality: through
habits of action, by participating in these practices. This
provides one possibility for characterizing art located in the
middle of the various and ubiquitous practices of life: It is art
on the move.
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